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Book Reviews 
E PLURIBUS UNUM? 
STATES' RIGHTS AND THE UNION: IMPERIUM IN 
IMPERIO, 1776-1876. By Forrest McDonald. 1 University 
Press of Kansas. 2000. Pp. vii, 296. $29.95. 
Much is said about the "sovereignty" of the States; but the 
word, even, is not in the national Constitution .... 
Abraham Lincoln2 
Daniel A. Farber3 
"[I]n the 1990s, as in the 1870s," Forrest McDonald ob-
serves, "states' rights had found a powerful friend but, given the 
five-to-four majority, still a fickle one." (p. 233) McDonald's 
new history of quarrels over federalism, then, comes at an op-
portune time. It is a useful introduction to the subject: a quick, 
lively read with well-chosen references. It lacks, however, the 
attention to detail and sensitivity toward political dynamics that 
characterized McDonald's earlier writings. 
The rhetoric of federalism, from 1776 to today, has often in-
voked the concept of sovereignty. This review will focus on 
McDonald's treatment of this key concept, both because of its 
intrinsic significance and because it illustrates some of the weak-
nesses of the book as a whole. 
I. Distinguished Research Professor of History, University of Alabama. 
2. Abraham Lincoln, Message to Congress in Special Session, July 4, 1861, in Lin-
coln: Selected Speeches and Writings 310 (1992 ed, Vintage Books) ("Selected Writings"). 
3. McKnight Presidential Professor of Public Law, Associate Dean for Faculty and 
Research, and Henry J. Fletcher Professor of Law, University of Minnesota. 
243 
244 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 18:243 
At least three major theories of sovereignty have figured in 
American thought. The most nationalistic view was Lincoln's. 
According to Lincoln, the colonies declared independence as a 
collective body, which thereby succeeded to the sovereignty 
formerly held by the King. This national sovereignty always re-
mained with the federal government throughout a series of gov-
ernmental reorganizations (first the Articles of Confederation, 
then the Constitution).4 (p. 9) The Union, Lincoln said in his 
most frequently cited statement of his position, "is older than 
any of the States; and, in fact, it created them as States" - for 
before they formed the Union and collectively declared inde-
pendence, they were mere "dependent colonies. "5 On this view, 
only the nation ever enjoyed sovereign status. 
A second view is that the states retained their separate sov-
ereignty until the adoption of the Constitution, which created a 
new national sovereign ("E pluribus unum").6 Under this view, 
the Constitution was a new social compact among the American 
people. This view is supported by references in the Federalist 
Papers to "the People" as the source of national political author-
ity. Thus, Federalist 22 speaks of the need to lay the "founda-
tion[ ] of our national government" "on the solid basis of THE 
CONSENT OF THE PEOPLE," the "pure, original fountain of 
all legitimate authority."7 Similarly, in discussing conflicts be-
tween the states and the federal government, Federalist 46 
speaks of both as representing "the whole body of their common 
4. Sec James M. McPherson, Battle Cry of Freedom: The Civil War Era 247-48 
(Oxford U. Press, 1988); Michael Kammen, A Machine That Would Go of Itself- The 
Constitution in American Culture 109 (Alfred A. Knopf, 1986) (reprinting a Civil War-era 
constitutional catechism); Kenneth M. Stampp, The Era of Reconstruction, 1865-1877 at 
25-27 (Alfred A. Knopf, 1965). 
5. Abraham Lincoln, Message to Congress in Special Session, July 4, 1861, in Se-
lected Writings 310 (cited in note 2). 
6. This theory was endorsed, for example, by the majority in the Term Limits case. 
See U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779,803 (1995). See also Charles Fried, 
The Supreme Court 1994 Term- Foreword: Revolutions?, 109 Harv. L. Rev. 13,22 (1995) 
(stressing the "discontinuity" between the Constitution and previous governmental ar-
rangements); Akhil Reed Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism, 96 Yale L.J. 1425, 1460 
(1987) (arguing that although Article VII said the Constitution would go into effect when 
ratified by nine states, it "confirmed the pre-existing sovereignty of the People of each 
state by proclaiming that the Constitution would only go into effect between the nine or 
more states ratifying," and that once the individual states ratified the Constitution they 
transferred their sovereignty to the people of the nation). 
7. Federalist 22 (Hamilton) in Isaac Kramnick, ed., The Federalist Papers 177, 184 
(Penguin Books, 1987). 
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constituents," 8 and refers to the states as "subordinate govern-
rnents."9 
The final view was Calhoun's. According to Calhoun, the 
people of each state separately became sovereign when they be-
carne independent of England. When they adopted the Consti-
tution, they retained their separate political existences, but dele-
gated some of their powers to the national government and some 
to the state governments. 10 As McDonald points out, Federalist 
39 seemingly supports this theory. (p. 19) Inquiring into the 
formation of the new Constitution, Federalist 39 explains that 
ratification takes place by the authority of the people - "not as 
individuals composing one entire nation, but as composing the 
distinct and independent States to which they respectively be-
long."11 Leaving little doubt of his view of the ratification proc-
ess, Madison goes on to call ratification a "federal and not a na-
tional act," that is, "the act of the people, as forming so many 
independent States, not as forming one aggregate nation." 12 
Note that under any of these three theories, neither the 
state nor federal governments (who are the only bodies exercis-
ing any direct regulatory power) are themselves sovereign. 
Rather, sovereignty resides either in the people of the United 
States as a whole, or in the separate peoples of the various states. 
In these debates, sovereignty does not refer to actual, day-to-day 
governing authority, but rather to ultimate sources of political 
authority. 
Since it is obvious that the Constitution was adopted and 
amended by the people of the various states, discussions of the 
topic often have a metaphysical air about them. The question is 
whether the people acted as an undivided whole incarnated in 
separate states or as distinct state communities in a joint venture 
(which then may or may not have merged into a single entity)-
8. Federalist 46 (Madison) in id. at 330. 
9. Id. at 331. 
10. See Amar, 96 Yale L.J. at 1452 & nn.108-09 (cited in note 6); Stampp, The Era 
of Reconstruction at 25 (cited in note 4); McPherson, Battle Cry of Freedom at 240 (cited 
in note 4). During the period before the civil war southern states justified secession with 
the theory that the state populace in adopting the Constitution had appointed the federal 
government to act as their agent to undertake certain functions, but that such an agency 
relationship did not transfer sovereignty to the federal government. David M. Potter, 
The Impending Crisis, 1848-1861 at 479 (Harper & Row, 1976). The people of each state, 
the theory went, retained the power to nullify the agency relationship by action of a state 
convention. Id. 
I I. Federalist 39 (Madison) in Isaac Kramnick, ed., The Federalist Papers 254, 257 
(Penquin Books, 1987). 
12. Id. 
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an issue reminiscent of medieval disputes about the true nature 
of the Trinity. Yet people were burned for mistaken views of 
the Trinity, and thousands died on Civil War battlefields while 
politicians debated the nature of sovereignty. 
McDonald seems to think that this abstruse matter of sov-
ereignty has a clear answer, and one that matters. In this he is 
not alone: as we will see below, at least four current Justices ap-
parently share his perspective. Yet, the Framers themselves had 
no established orthodoxy on this point, and the muddled politi-
cal developments of their times confound efforts to identify sov-
ereignty after the fact. In Federalist 39, which refers to the ori-
gins of the Constitution in the "federal" action of the peoples of 
the various states, Madison concludes by speaking of the untidy 
mixed nature of the new government: 
The proposed Constitution ... is, in strictness, neither a na-
tional nor a federal Constitution, but a composition of both. 
In its foundation it is federal, not national; in the sources from 
which the ordinary powers of the government are drawn, it is 
partly federal and partly national; in the operation of these 
powers, it is national, not federal; in the extent of them, again, 
it is federal, not national; and, finally in the authoritative 
mode of introducin9 amendments, it is neither wholly federal 
nor wholly national. 3 
Thus, if there was a simple answer about the location of 
sovereignty after ratification, the Framers themselves apparently 
didn't know it. Whether the concept of sovereignty has any 
greater utility in constitutional analysis today is at least equally 
unclear. There is no denying, however, that it retains great rhe-
torical force. 14 As Rakove says, after 1789, "sovereignty itself 
would remain diffused-which is to say, it would exist every-
where and nowhere." 15 
I. THE REVIVAL OF THE STATE COMPACT THEORY 
He views the Constitution as a compact among multiple 
sovereign peoples: 
The Constitution would be a compact not among sovereign 
13. ld. at 259. 
14. Sec Jack N. Rakove, Making a Hash of Sovereignty, Part I, 2 Green Bag 2d 35 
(1998); Jack N. Rakove, Making a Hash of Sovereignty, Part II, 3 Green Bag 2d 51 
(1999). 
15. Rakove, 2 Green Bag 2d at 41 (cited in note 14). 
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states, as was the 1781 Articles of Confederation, nor a 
Lockean compact between ruler and ruled, nor even a com-
pact of the whole people among themselves. It would be a 
compact among peoples of different political societies, in their 
capacities as people of the several states. (pp. 8-9) 
247 
For this reason, he argues, John Calhoun's theory of the Consti-
tution "was historically on solid ground." (p.106) In contrast, 
according to McDonald, the nationalist view of history espoused 
by Daniel Webster, John Marshall, and Abraham Lincoln was 
groundless. (p. 9-11, 106) 
The nature of sovereignty in the framing period is not 
merely a matter of dispute among academics, but is also cur-
rently dividing the Supreme Court. In 1995, the state compact 
theory propounded by McDonald made an unexpected reap-
pearance in the Supreme Court in the Term Limits case. Term 
Limits involved a state's power to set term limits for members of 
Congress. The majority view was that this power pertained 
solely to the new government created by the Constitution rather 
than any preexisting state authority, and hence was not "re-
served" by the Tenth Amendment. In the course of this discus-
sion, Justice Stevens' majority opinion explains the conventional 
view of state and federal sovereignty. Under the Articles of 
Confederation, "the States retained most of their sovereignty, 
like independent nations bound together only by treaties." The 
new Constitution "reject[ed] the notion that the Nation was a 
collection of States, and instead creat[ ed] a direct link between 
the National Government and the people of the United 
States. "16 A patchwork of local qualifications for federal office, 
Justice Stevens stated, would "sever the direct link that the 
Framers found so critical between the National Government and 
the people of the United States." 17 
Justice Thomas's dissent squarely rejected this vision of na-
tional sovereignty: "Because the majority fundamentally misun-
derstands the notion of 'reserved' powers, I start with some first 
principles."18 The most basic of those first principles, according 
16. U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 803 (internal quotations and 
citations omitted). 
17. Id. at 822. 
18. Id. at 846 (Thomas, J., dissenting). As Kathleen Sullivan points out, Thomas's 
dissent embraced the "constitutional ontology" of the Southern nullificationists like Cal-
houn, though it "did not go so far as to advocate state nullification." Kathleen Sullivan, 
Dueling Sovereignties: U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 109 Harv. L. Rev. 78, 98-99 
(1995). 
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to Justice Thomas, was this: "The ultimate source of the Consti-
tution's authority is the consent of the people of each individual 
State, not the consent of the undifferentiated people of the Na-
tion as a whole." 19 Despite the adoption of the Constitution, 
"_the I;'
0
eople of_ each State retained their separate political i~enti­
tles."- Even m language where others have found an affuma-
tion of national unity, Justice Thomas found a reaffirmation of 
the fundamental status of the states as compared with the Na-
tion: 
The ringing initial words of the Constitution- "We the Peo-
ple of the United States" -convey something of the same 
idea. (In the Constitution, after all, "the United States" is 
consistently a plural noun.) The Preamble that the Philadel-
phia Convention approved before sending the Constitution to 
the Committee of Style is even clearer. It began: "We the 
people of the States of New-Hampshire, Massachusetts, 
Rhode-Island and Providence Plantations, Connecticut, New-
York, New-Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, Vir-
ginia, North-Carolina, South-Carolina, and Georgia .... " 
Scholars have suggested that the Committee of Style adopted 
the current language because it was not clear that all the 
States would actually ratify the Constitution.21 
In short, Justice Thomas said, the concept of popular sovereignty 
underlying the Constitution "tracks" rather than erases state 
lines.22 Indeed, he said, it would make no sense to interpret the 
Tenth Amendment as reserving powers to the "undifferentiated 
people of the Nation as a whole, because the Constitution does 
not contemplate that those people will either exercise power or 
delegate it. The Constitution simply does not recognize any 
mechanism for action by the undifferentiated people of the Na-
tion. "23 
Justice Kennedy refused to go along with Thomas's view of 
state sovereignty in Term Limits. In his view, the heart of the le-
gitimacy of the federal government is "that it owes its existence 
to the act of the whole people who created it."24 Although the 
Framers, in his view, were "solicitous of the prerogatives of the 
19. U.S. Term Limits, 514 at 849. 
20. Id. at 849. 
21. Id. at 846-47 n.l (citations omitted). On Justice Thomas's interpretation, a 
more accurate wording might have been, "We the Peoples of the United States." 
22. I d. at 849. 
23. Id. at 847. 
24. Id. at 839 (Kennedy, J., concurring). See also id. at 841. 
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States," the states cannot be allowed to interfere with the exer-
cise of federal powers or with "the most basic relation between 
the National Government and its citizens, the selection of legis-
lative representatives."25 Kennedy denied that "the sole political 
identity of an American is with the State of his or her residence," 
and he emphatically rejected the view that "the people of the 
United States do not have a political identity as well, one inde-
pendent of, though consistent with, their identity as citizens of 
the State of their residence. "26 
More recently, however, in Alden v. Maine, 27 Justice Ken-
nedy joined the four Term Limits dissenters in proclaiming that 
the states retain "a residuary and inviolable sovereignty" or at 
least, as he quickly added, "the dignity, though not the full au-
thority of sovereignty. "28 Thus, the state sovereignty theory is 
close to having majority support on the Court. Because of the 
reemergence of state sovereignty, McDonald's book should be 
of interest to constitutional scholars, as well as historians. But 
the historical record turns out to be more ambiguous than 
McDonald suggests-for once, it not just the judges but also the 
professional historian who is guilty of writing "law office his-
tory." 
II. THE ORIGINAL AMBIGUITIES 
We might begin by asking about the original understanding 
of the sovereignty issue. Did the Framers view the populations 
of the states as entirely separate peoples, or did they view them 
as part of a national people (either before or after the Constitu-
tion went into effect)? 
The concept of sovereignty had great resonance for the 
Framing generation and has generated a corresponding amount 
of interest on the part of historians. 29 Unraveling the meaning of 
the historical records is quite difficult. The debate was driven by 
25. Id. at 841-42. 
26. Id. at 840. 
27. 527 U.S. 706 (1999). 
28. Id. at 2247 (internal quotation and citation omitted). 
29. For discussions by recent historians, see Richard B. Morris, The Forging of the 
Union, 1781-1789 at 55-59 (Harper & Row, 1987); Samuel H. Beer, To Make a Nation: 
The Rediscovery of American Federalism 197-202, 236, 248-55, 314-15, 320-28 (Belknap 
Press, 1993); Gordon S. Wood, The Creation of the American Republic 1776-1778 at 344-
389, 524-36 (U. of North Carolina Press, 1969). The evolution of the concept of Union 
between the founding and the Civil War is traced in Paul C. Nagel, One Nation Invisible: 
the Union in American Thought, 1776-1861 (1964). 
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immediate political interests, which gave the participants an in-
centive to distort whatever their true philosophical positions 
about sovereignty might have been.30 Various senses of the 
word "sovereignty" were not carefully distinguished.31 As 
McDonald himself observed in an earlier book, the Framers 
were "politically multilingual," using a variety of political theo-
ries whenever it suited their purposes.32 In the end, it is difficult 
to identify a single dominant theoretical understanding. As the 
dispute in the Term Limits case illustrates, there is no consensus 
about which of these theories was the dominant understanding 
of the framing period.33 
The documents of the period reflect uncertainty about 
whether the United States already existed as a nation so that in 
some sense the Americans were one people rather than thirteen. 
Indeed, this uncertainty could be seen in the views of the consti-
tutional convention itself. At the end of the summer of 1787, 
the Philadelphia convention issued two official documents. One 
was the Constitution itself. As McDonald points out, some fea-
tures of the Constitution (such as its grammatical treatment of 
"United States" as a plural) support the state compact theory. 
(pp. 20-22) On the other hand, the reference to "We, the People 
of the United States" clearly points in the other direction (even 
if, as McDonald points out, the phrasing may have had other 
purposes). (pp. 21-22) 
Somewhat more light is shed on the views of the convention 
by the other document it unanimously adopted, an official letter 
to Congress, signed by George Washington on behalf of the 
Convention. 34 The letter invokes the language of social compact 
30. For example, one issue was whether the colonies declared independence collec-
tively, so that sovereignty at least momentarily reposed in the Continental Congress, or 
severally, so that it resided in the states at the time of Independence. This seemingly eso-
teric question had legal implications regarding title to vast disputed areas of land. Under 
the former theory, Western land claimed by Virginia had instead reverted to the Conti-
nental Congress at the time of Independence. See Forrest McDonald, Novus Ordo Se-
clorum: The Intellectual Origins of the Constitution 146 (U. Press of Kansas, 1985). 
31. For a discussion of the confusion during the Framing period, see H. Jefferson 
Powell, The Political Grammar of Early Constitutional Law, 71 N.C. L. Rev. 949,985-87 
(1993). 
32. McDonald, Novus Ordo at 235 (cited in note 30). 
33. Compare Justice Thomas's views in his Term Limits dissent with those of Jus-
tice Kennedy's concurrence. As to the views of leading modern commentators, see 
Amar, 96 Yale L.J. at 1425, 1429-51 (cited in note 6); H. Jefferson Powell, The Oldest 
Question of Constitutional Law, 79 Va. L. Rev. 633, 654-60 (1993). 
34. For the complete text of the letter and a fuller discussion of its significance, see 
Daniel A. Farber, The Constitution's Forgotten Cover Letter: An Essay on the New Fed-
eralism and the Original Understanding, 94 Mich. L. Rev. 615 (1995) (citing letter of the 
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rather than that of treaty: "It is obviously impracticable in the 
federal government of these states, to secure all rights of inde-
pendent sovereignty to each, and yet provide for the interest and 
safety of all: Individuals entering into society, must give up a 
share of liberty to preserve the rest." The implications of this 
analogy to the social compact would later be discussed in the 
Federalist Papers: 
If individuals enter into a state of society, the laws of that so-
ciety must be the supreme regulator of their conduct. If a 
number of political societies enter into a larger political soci-
ety, the laws which the latter may enact, pursuant to the 
power intrusted to it by its constitution, must necessarily be 
supreme over those societies and the individuals of whom 
they are composed. It would otherwise be a mere treaty, de-
pendent on the good faith of the parties, and not a govern-
ment.35 
The letter also warns that the "consolidation" of the Union in-
volves "our prosperity, felicity, safety, perhaps our national exis-
tence." The implication is seemingly that in some sense there 
was already a "national existence" capable of being at risk, 
which is to say that the United States under the Articles of Con-
federation was already a nation of sorts rather than a league. 
Indeed, even during the Convention itself, the status of the 
states had been a matter of dispute. Luther Martin argued that 
separation from England had placed the former colonies "in a 
state of nature towards each other" and only then had the these 
"separate sovereign ties" formed a federal government. James 
Wilson responded that the states became independent only 
through their combined action: "they were independent, not In-
dividually but Unitedly. "36 
As these materials indicate-and as others confirm-the 
understanding of sovereignty in the late Eighteenth Century was 
far from settled. For every Forrest McDonald who espouses the 
state compact theor~ of the record, there is a Samuel Beer with a 
nationalist reading. 3 
President of the Federal Convention to the President of Congress (Sept. 17, 1787), in 
Charles C. Tansill, ed., Formation of the Union of the American States 1003 (Government 
Printing Office, 1927)). 
35. Federalist 33 (Hamilton) in Isaac Kramnick, ed., The Federalist Papers 225 
(Penguin Books, 1987). 
36. See Jack N. Rakove, Original Meanings: Politics and Ideas in the Making of the 
Constitution 163 (Alfred A. Knopf, 1996). 
37. See Beer, To Make A Nation 1-12, 196-202,314-25 (cited in note 29). 
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Given the undoubted importance of the concept of sover-
eignty in American political thought, (or at least rhetoric), why 
was there no clear consensus on this critical issue? The issue was 
both intellectually subtle and irrelevant for most practical pur-
poses. The key issues facing the country involved the division of 
powers between the state and federal governments. The sover-
eignty issue involved the question of whether the population of 
America should be considered a single group forming a national 
government, thirteen separate groups agreeing on joint govern-
ment but entirely maintaining their own separate group identi-
ties, or thirteen separate groups agreeing to merge their identi-
ties and form a unified group for at least some purposes. 
Whatever else might be said about this dispute, it provided little 
guidance in designing the national government. As 1 ack Rakove 
puts it, "no single vector neatly charted the course the framers 
took in allocating power between the Union and the states."38 
Rather, as Madison stressed in Federalist 37, experience and 
practical exigencies rather than abstract theory shaped the Con-
stitution. 
This is probably just as well. As we will see in the next sec-
tion, there were no easy answers to the questions of who was 
sovereign in 1776 when Independence was declared or in 1788 
when the Constitution was ratified. If the Framers had made the 
mistake of trying to settle the sovereignty issue before proceed-
ing, the Constitution probably would never come into being. 
III. THE "REALITY" OF SOVEREIGNTY 
McDonald presents a coherent story about the evolution of 
sovereignty in America. He tells us that the colonies had "thir-
teen real compacts in the form of charters that gave them exis-
tence as political societies." (p. 8) When they each declared 
their separate independence in a joint declaration, (p. 10) sover-
eignty reverted to each of the thirteen, (p. 8) or in the cases of 
Massachusetts and New Hampshire, to individual towns. (p. 236 
n.3) As an agent for the states, the Continental Congress con-
ducted the war, but the states retained the sovereign power. (p. 
4) Then, the sovereign peoples of the thirteen states entered 
into a mutual agreement to create a federal government, retain-
ing all the while their separate sovereignty. (p. 9) 
38. Rakove, Original Meanings at 168 (cited in note 36). 
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We can imagine a historical record in which this story could 
pass as plainly descriptive. Imagine that, when unhappiness with 
English rule reached a pitch, representatives in each colony had 
determined to pursue independence and had drafted a new con-
stitution for that colony which was ratified by the people. Acting 
under the new constitutions, state governments then sent dele-
gates to form a league with the similarly established new gov-
ernments in the other former colonies. When the initial ar-
rangement proved unsatisfactory, their delegates proposed 
giving greater power to the league's management. The new ar-
rangements were approved by the peoples of each separate state, 
who retained a veto over any future changes in the arrangement. 
On these facts, we would say that McDonald's version of the 
state compact theory was no more than an accurate recounting 
of events. 
On the other hand, we can imagine a historical record em-
bodying the nationalist record. In this story, the unhappy colo-
nists send representatives to decide on independence and form a 
national government. The new government in turn authorizes 
autonomous action by local subdivisions, which act as the 
equivalent of counties in today's states. When changes are pro-
posed to strengthen the government, they go into effect nation-
wide after being approved by a majority of the population 
(meeting in local conventions). These events would have made 
Lincoln's nationalist version of the founding unimpeachable his-
tory. 
The realities were much more messy and complex than ei-
ther of these scenarios. Begin with Independence. As McDon-
ald points out, the Declaration speaks in the plural, declaring the 
colonies to be "free and independent states" and says that 
"they" have the full powers of independent states. (p. 10) On 
the other hand, no colony declared independence on its own.39 
Even before Independence, the Continental Congress was al-
ready functioning as an effective government,40 Moreover, 
rather than being lawfully selected by the existing legislatures 
within the colonies, the representatives at the First Continental 
Congress were chosen in a variety of extralegal ways, including 
revolutionary committees and impromptu elections.41 Further-
more, no state gave itself a constitution before being invited to 
39. See Beer, To Make a Nation at 200 (cited in note 29). 
40. Id. at 199. 
41. Id. at 197. 
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do so by Congress.42 Thus, as Rakove says, "[p]ower and legiti-
ma~j ... flowed reciprocally" between national and local lead-
ers. 
In practice, the states deferred to national decisions during 
the Revolution: "local revolutionaries always preferred to com-
mit treason with the explicit sanction of Congress."44 From the 
start, the states accepted the primacy of Congress in foreign rela-
tions.45 In addition, the states looked for national assistance in 
resolving boundary disputes and combating local separatist 
movements.46 Still-confounding any purely nationalist ac-
count-the Articles of Confederation (while purportedly per-
petual) explicitly recognized the sovereignty of each state. Thus, 
in form, the Articles were more like a present-day interstate 
compact than a constitution.47 Yet in reality, Congress func-
tioned as a government, not merely as a negotiating forum for a 
league of sovereign states.48 
In 1789, the federal Constitution had at least as much claim 
to be a social compact, uniting the populace, as any of the state 
constitutions. Most state constitutions had less democratic le-
gitimacy than the later federal Constitution. The initial state 
constitutions were ordinary acts of legislation.49 Eventually it 
became common to hold new elections before their adoption,50 
but it was only in 1779 that the idea of popular ratification of the 
constitutions emerged.51 (p. 8) This was of course the path fol-
lowed by the federal constitution. Ratification of the Constitu-
tion took place at the state level and was only valid between the 
ratifying states-support for the compact view. Yet ratification 
also supported the idea of national popular rule. In states whose 
own constitution had weaker pedigrees, ratification of the fed-
eral constitution was the first true act of popular sovereignty. 
Also, the reality of ratification was more national than the form 
of state-by-state conventions. The requirement that nine states 
ratify was partly chosen because any group of nine states would 
42. Id. at 200-01. 
43. Id. at 164. 
44. Rakove, Original Meanings at 164 (cited in note 36). 
45. Id. at 166. 
46. Id. at 165. 
47. See Beer, To Make a Nation at 202 (cited in note 37). See also Rakove, Origi-
nal Meanings at 100 (cited in note 36). 
48. See Beer, To Make a Nation at 196 (cited in note 37). 
49. See Wood, The Creation of the American Republic at 307 (cited in note 29). 
50. !d. at 332. 
51. Id. at 341-42. 
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contain at least a majority of the national population.52 In prac-
tice the momentum became unstoppable once nine states had 
ratified. 53 
After ratification, the amendment process of Article V gave 
the separate peoples of each state significantly less independent 
authority. The amendment process requires the cooperation of 
Congress and the states. With the concurrence (or at least assis-
tance, under the convention mode) of Congress, three-quarters 
of the states have the power to do whatever they wish to the re-
maining one quarter except taking away their Senate representa-
tion. Thus, no single state or its people can have any remaining 
claim to sovereign power. If sovereignty means unchecked legal 
power, then, it now resides (if anywhere) in the "Amenders," 
consisting of various combinations of Congressional super-
majorities (or majorities, in the case of calling a convention at 
the request of the states), plus super-majorities of either state 
legislatures or state conventions (at the choice of Congress). 54 
Behind Congress, state legislatures, and state conventions lie the 
voting public, who have no direct formal role in the amending 
process but elect all of the formal participants. These voters 
combine in various configurations-state legislative districts, 
statewide conventions and Senate elections, and federal election 
districts, most of which have little conceivable claim to sover-
eignty. 
Not only is the ultimate control of the amendment process 
divided among different institutions and configurations of voters, 
it is a very remote form of sovereignty. Indeed, this supposedly 
supreme sovereign power has acted fewer than thirty times in 
history, and has done little of significance in nearly a century. 
Nor did the allocation of the amending power have anything 
much to do with how other powers were divided between the 
state governments and the federal government. Under the new 
Constitution, although Amenders are the theoretical sovereign, 
they neither control issues of war and peace, nor the national 
economy, which were given to the federal government, nor local 
52. See Beer, To Make a Nation at 335 (cited in note 29). 
53. ld. at 332. Even Rhode Island (or "rogue island," as it was often called) was 
forced to give in by 1790, only three years after the Constitution was proposed. (p. 20) 
54. Actually, the federal role is if anything greater than Article V would suggest, for 
any disputes about the amendment process would ultimately be decided either by the 
federal courts or the national political branches. In addition, in the guise of ensuring a 
republican form of government, Congress can potentially control the identity of the state 
governments that participate in the process, as it did during Reconstruction. 
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matters such as property and family law, which were assumed to 
rest with the state governments. In short, the notion of sover-
eignty may have remained rhetorically potent, but it had little 
relevance to constitutional law. 
Thus, although we can easily imagine a history of the fram-
ing period where ultimate sovereignty is easily identifiable-
whether with a unitary national population or with separate state 
political communities-the actual history (and the resulting 
Constitution) was an impossible muddle. The Framers could 
have had very little idea of whether the people of the United 
States existed as a unified political community before the Consti-
tution was enacted, or of whether the Constitution itself gave 
shape to such a community. 
To the extent that these questions have answers today, it is 
not because they were settled by the history of the framing pe-
riod, but rather because later events such as the Civil War de-
stroyed any genuine vitality of the idea of state populations as 
truly independent sovereigns. Early in the Civil War, Lincoln de-
fined a sovereign as a "political community, without a political 
superior."55 In this core sense, sovereignty is determined by the 
ultimate seat of political authority, not by history or texts. In 
terms of the language of today's political scientists, this concept 
of a completely final political authority is called domestic sover-
eignty.56 Sovereignty, in this sense, was only fixed once and for 
all on the fields of Antietam and Gettysburg. Only after the Civil 
War could it be said with assurance that the nation, rather than 
the states, enjoyed the final power of decision, that no funda-
mental political question could be decided against the will of the 
national polity. Only then did it become clear that as political 
communities the states were subordinate to the nation. 
Holmes once said that, while the Framers had "created an 
organism" of some sort, "it has taken a century and has cost 
their successors much sweat and blood to prove that they created 
a nation. "57 (Holmes learned this lesson the hard way, as a vet-
eran of the Twentieth Massachusetts who was almost killed at 
Antietam and Ball's Blufe8) After the war, it could no longer 
55. Abraham Lincoln, Message to Congress in Special Session, July 4, 1861, in Se-
lected Writings 310 (cited in note 2). 
56. Sec Stephen D. Krasner, Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy 11 (Princeton U. 
Press, 1999). 
57. Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416,433 (1920). 
58. See Richard A. Posner, ed., The Essential Holmes ix (U. of Chicago Press, 
1992). 
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be doubted that the federal government's authority rested on 
some broader authority than the consent of the people of any 
individual state. 
With political sovereignty, as with other, more critical mat-
ters such as slavery, the Framing generation's unfinished busi-
ness could only be resolved in the agony of battle. Thus, if sov-
ereignty was ever settled, it was only much later than 1789, and 
even then, it was determined more as a matter of political reality 
than constitutional theory. 
In terms of the original understanding, the only clearly 
wrong answer about the concept of sovereignty is that there is a 
clearly right answer. How does McDonald go so badly wrong? 
The problem is as much his method as his use of historical mate-
rials. His analysis invokes a series of purported rules. For in-
stance, he says, because the King had constituted the colonies as 
separate political communities, sovereignty must have reverted 
to those separate communities when the King was evicted. (p. 8) 
Similarly, Congress could not have formed the state govern-
ments, because it was an agent of the states as existing political 
societies, and "in the nature of things, agents cannot authorize 
their principals to do anything." (p. 9) Thus, McDonald seems 
to think that sovereignty is something real, not an intellectual 
construct, and that its creation is the subject of clear laws. 
In this error, he perhaps shows the defects of his virtues. In 
the preface, he refers to "those of us who have spent most of our 
adult lives in the eighteenth century." (p. viii) One can only 
envy such immersion in that great period of history, which must 
be a major asset for a historian. In analyzing issues of political 
authority on basis of the "nature of things," however, McDonald 
seems to be guilty of a very Eighteenth Century mistake. Con-
ceptual analysis can provide little assistance, when the subject is 
sovereignty. 
